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THE ASSOCIATED PRESS CASE
By a divided vote the United States Supreme Court has held that
one who gathers news for sale is, for a limited period of time after
its publication in news bulletin or newspapers, entitled to restrain its
dissemination for commercial purposes by business competitors.
International News Service, Petitioner, v. The Associated Press (Dec.
23, 1918) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, No. 221.1 The problem presented
to the court was purely one of state "common law," 2 for the juris-
diction of the federal courts depended solely upon diversity of citizen-
ship and there were no statutes involved. For the holding there was
no exact precedent in any court of last resort, as Mr. Justice Brandeis
makes clear in the dissenting opinion. Many more or less analogous
situations had of course been passed upon. Over and over again courts
have vindicated the rights of producers to prohibit the copying of
For complete statement of facts see REcENT CASE NOTES, infra.
2 "Common law" is here used in the meaning of "unwritten law" as dis-.
tinguished from statutory law. It therefore includes the judge-made "equity
law" as well as "common law law"--if such a phrase is permissible.
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uncopyrighted literary compositions, lectures, paintings, and dramatic
and musical compositions, even though they have been communicated
or exhibited to a limited number of persons.3 So also trade secrets
are protected so long as they are not given to the general public. 4 In
the so-called "ticker cases" it is established that before "news" has
been "published," i. e., communicated to the public generally, "pirat-
ing" it is unlawful, although here too it may have been communicated
to a limited number of persons. 5 In all of these there is the common
element that protection is given to something produced by the com-
plaining party which has never been given to the public generally,
although it has been revealed or exhibited to a limited number of per-
sons for special purposes. In the principal case the court was invited
to take a new step and extend protection to the gatherer of news even
after general publication. In several of the "ticker cases" there is
general language which assumes this to be the law, a common way
of putting it being that a news gatherer has "a property right" in his
news.
It is noteworthy that in the prevailing opinion, written by Mr. Jus-
tice Pitney, reliance is not placed upon these dicta. He says: "We
need spend no time upon the general question of property in news
matter at common law . . . since it seems to us the case must turn
upon the question of unfair competition in business." In spite of this,
however, we soon find the learned justice saying that "as between the
parties," news matter "must be regarded as quasi property." To the
mind of the present writer, such general expressions--"property right
in news," "quasi property," etc.-are so vague as to be of little value
in reaching sound conclusions. 6 The situation needs closer analysis
'Space permits the citation of only a few of the leading cases. Many others
are cited in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis. Literary composi-
tions: Webb v. Rose (1733) Amb. 695; Donaldson v. Beckett (774, H. L.)
4 Burr. 24o8; Wheaton v. Peters (3834, U. S.) 8 Pet. 591. Letters: Thompson
v. Lord Chesterfield (1774) Amb. 737; Gee v. Pritchard (1818) 2 Swans. 402;
Baker v. Libbie (1912) 210 Mass. 599, 97 N. E. lO9 (see note in 37 L. R. A.,
N. S. 944). Dramatic compositions: Macklin v. Richardson (1770) Amb. 694;
Ferris v. Frohman (1912) 223 U. S. 424, 32 Sup. Ct. 263; Thompkins v. Halleck
(1882) 133 Mass. 32. Lectures: Cullen's Case (1771, Ch.) 12 App. Cas. 332,
note 2; Caird v. Site (1887) 12 App. Cas. 326. Paintings: Turner v. Robin-
son (186o) iO Ir. Ch. 121.
'Salonon v. Hertz (1885) 4o N. J. Eq. 4o0. A large number of the authorities
are collected and discussed in 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1O2; 20 ibid. 933; 44 ibid. 116o.
'Exchange Telegraph Co. v. Gregory [1896] I Q. B. 147; Kiernan v. Man-
hattan Quotation Telegraph Co. (1876, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 5o How. Pr. 194;
Board of Trade v. Christie Grain, etc. Co. (19o5) 198 U. S. 236, 25 Sup. Ct. 637.
'To say that a person who "owns" something has "a property right" is a
totally inadequate way of describing the legal situation. An adequate analysis
reveals that the "owner" of anything has a more or less comprehensive aggre-
gate of rights, privileges, powers and immunities, and that other persons
indiscriminately are under the respective correlative duties, no-rights, liabilities
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and the problem must be stated in more concrete terms. After gen-
eral publication does the news' gatherer have, with reference to his
news, any rights, privileges, etc., and if so, just what and how extensive
are they? Prior cases, as we have seen, have settled that so long as
the news has been communicated only to a limited number of persons
for special purposes only, the one gathering the news has: (I) rights
that the ones to whom the communication is made shall not repeat it
to others except as authorized by the agreement; and (2) rights
against people generally7 that they shall not obtain and communicate
to others the news in question without the consent of its gatherer.,
Our problem then is, do these rights entirely cease upon publication,
or do they continue, in whole or in part? One thing seems clear: after
news has been given to the public, as it was in the principal case,
'people generally are privileged to repeat the news to other people for
non-commercial purposes, i. e., the news gatherer now has no-rights
that they refrain from communicating to others the news in question,
so long as it is for such non-commercial purposes. To this extent,
at least, the rights of the news gatherer are less than before publica-
tion. How now if the repetition to others is by a business competitor
of the plaintiff and for the purpose of competing with him as a seller
of news ?9 That repetition for this purpose is forbidden for a period
long enough to enable the news gatherer to derive a fair business
advantage from his expenditure of time and energy, is at least con-
ceivable-and it is just this that MV4r. Justice Pitney seems to have in
mind when he says that the question is one of "unfair competition."
Whether such a result is desirable cannot, of course, be determined
except by a careful consideration of the policy involved, i. e., of the
results likely to follow from the recognition of such rights.
The admirably brief and lucid opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes-con-
curred in by Mr. Justice McKenna-accepts the point of view of the
majority to the extent of regarding the problem as one of "unfair
competition." The learned justice, however, believed that the prin-
and disabilities. The rights of the "owner" are innumerable; so are the
privileges, the powers, the immunities, i. e., they are all in ren, or "multital"jural relations. See the discussion by Professor Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
710, 746. The phrase "jural relation" seems preferable to "legal relation," for
the word "legal" suggests "common law" as distinguished from "equity,"
-whereas "jural" clearly includes both. Many jural relations are, of course,
-exclusively equitable.
'That is, rights in ren or "multital" rights. See preceding note.
"The cases are cited in note 5, supra. A complete analysis of the situation
would reveal the existence of privileges, powers and immunities as well.
'The court treated the'newspapers composing The Associated Press as the
real plaintiffs. While the defendant did not sell news directly to the public
-but only to newspapers, it is believed the court is right in treating the defendant
as a "competitor" of the plaintiffs within a fair meaning of that term.
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ciples governing that branch of our law did not warrant the court in
going farther than to hold that the defendant must, if it used the plain-
tiff's news, suitably acknowledge its source.' 0
In his dissenting opinion Mr. justice Brandeis, after a demonstration
that previous cases leave the question an open one, devotes himself
to an argument that sound policy requires that courts refrain from
creating rights of this character. His view seems to be that courts
will be unable so to mould the resulting legal situation as to safeguard
these rights from abuse.'1 When one notices that the protection asked
for, if given, is for a very limited time-only so long as the statements
of fact have commercial value as news2-one can hardly share the
fears expressed by. the learned justice that the rule established by the
majority will result in any serious interference with the acquisition by
the public of information as to the happenings of the world. On the
contrary, it seems to the present writer that the protection given the
news gatherer by the decision will in the long run have the effect of
stimulating the gathering and publication of news. Indeed it is dif-
ficult to see how, without it, a great and efficient news-gathering organi-
zation could be maintained, in view of the enormous expense necessarily
"
0He felt that the result of what the defendants were doing made the public
believe, at least in many cases, that The Associated Press had copied from the
defendant, and so discredited the news service of the plaintiff.
' Thus he says: "Courts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which
should precede a determination of the limitations which should be set upon
any property right in news or of the circumstances under which news gathered
by a private agency should be deemed affected with a public interest. Courts
would be powerless to prescribe the detailed regulations essential to full enjoy-
ment of the rights conferred or to introduce the machinery required for
enforcement of such regulations. Considerations such as these should lead us
to decline to establish a new rule of law in the effort to redress a newly-dis-
closed wrong, although the propriety of some remedy appears to be clear."
(The italics are those of the present writer.)
'The injunction previously directed by the District Court restrained the
defendant from "any taking or gainfully using of the complainant's news, either
bodily or in substance, . . . until its commercial value as news to the com-
plainant and all its members has passed away." This injunction was a prelim-
inary one, granted upon a consideration of the bill and answer and affidavits
on both sides. The defendant objected to the indefiniteness of the portion in
italics. To this the Supreme Court said: "Perhaps it would be better that the
terms of the injunction be made specific, and so framed as to confine the
restraint to an extent consistent with the reasonable protection of complainant's
newspapers, each in its own area and for a specified time after its publication,
against the competitive use of pirated news by defendant's customers. But
the case presents practical difficulties; and we have not the materials, either in
the way of a definite suggestion of amendment, or in the way of proofs, upon
which to frame a specific injunction; hence, while not expressing approval of
the form adopted by the District Court, we decline to modify it at this pre-
liminary stage of the case, and will leave that court to deal with the matter
upon appropriate application made to it for the purpose."
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involved. Hence it is believed that a refusal to accord the protection
sought would do more than anything else to discourage legitimate and
desirable enterprise in news collection and dissemination.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Brandeis shares the illusion
of probably the majority of the legal profession that by such a refusal
to give the plaintiff the relief he asked (the problem presented being
admitted to be a new one) the court would avoid making "a new rule
of law."'1  This of course is not true. It is usually overlooked-
indeed at times it is denied"--that in settling that under a given state
of facts the person involved is privileged to act in a certain way, a
court determines the jural relations of that person to other human
beings. Those who deny that a privilege is a jural relation would,
if they were logical, have to say that a decision for the defendant in
the principal case would involve a determination of a mere question of
fact and not of the jural relations of the parties. Surely, this cannot
be so. When courts determine that certain facts give a witness a
privilege not to testify, or that certain other facts make defamatory
remarks about one's neighbor "privileged" and so-not actionable, they
are determining the jural relations of the parties, just as much as if
they were to find against the privileges claimed and thereby to rec-
ognize the existence of rights. Whichever way a new problem is
decided, therefore, the court establishes for the first time what legal
relations result from the state of facts in question. If the decision is
for the plaintiff, a right and correlative duty are recognized; if the
defendant -wins, his privilege and the correlative no-right of the plain-
tiff are recognized. So Mr. Justice Brandeis, in holding that the
defendant was privileged to pirate the plaintiff's news, was laying down
"a new rule of law" just as clearly as was the majority when they
held that the defendant was not privileged.
W. W. C.
REVOCATION OF LICENSES WITHOUT A HEARING
The line of demarcation between the police power and the limitation
of the fourteenth amendment is continually moving in the direction of
a wider extension of the police power with a concomitant retreat and
weakening of the restraining force of the fourteenth amendment.' In
specific application to the regulation of occupations, this movement
is marked by an ever growing social control over private enterprise
and in a subjection to license of many occupations hitherto considered
" See the passage quoted in the preceding note.
"' Sir Frederick Pollock seems to do so in his volume on Jurisprudence (2d
ed., I9o4) 62. The passage is quoted and criticized by Professor Hohfeld in
(I913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, i6, 42.See Bunting v. Oregon (917) 243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct 435.
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free from any public interest or need of restraint for the public wel-
fare.2 Yet, while allowing wide discretion to the legislature in its
conclusion that a particular industry or occupation requires public
regulation, the courts, in the exercise of judicial control, will test the
constitutionality of a statutory or administrative regulation by its ten&
ency to accomplish a legitimate governmental purpose or its "reason-
ableness" in the adaptation of means to ends. Thus, in recent years,
numerous regulations of particular occupations have been held uncon-
stitutional, for example, arbitrary or inappropriate tests to determine
fitness for the occupation of railroad conductor 3 or undertaker 4 and a
requirement of licenses or license fees from horseshoers,5 cement con-
tractors,6 laundrymen, 7 owners of dancing schools,8 department stores,9
etc.
It is in the administration of regulations for the grant and revocation
of occupational licenses that confusion in the law is to be found. Two
lines of decision may be noted. In the one, it is held that the legis-
lature may not constitutionally confide to the unregulated discretion,
even though honestly exercised, of an administrative officer, the grant
or refusal of a license to engage in an occupation which, without a
license, would be illegal. These dfecisions rest on various grounds,
either on the unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, on alleged
looseness amounting to unreasonableness, or an administrative oppor-
tunity for arbitrary discrimination.1" The other line of decisions finds
no infringement of the fourteenth amendment in the grant of a com-
plete discretion, honestly exercised, to administrative license authori-
ties, a view which has the support of the United States Supreme
Court,11 and is generally sustained on the theory that the legislative
power to prohibit involves the power to permit on conditions deemed
appropriate. Freund's suggestion that the difference in the decisions
follows the distinction between occupations subject to regulation and
those subject to prohibition, while not fully satisfactory as a test, is
'For a list of such occupations, see 17 R. C. L. 548.
'Smith v. Texas (1914) 233 U. S. 63o, 34 Sup. Ct. 681.
'People v. Harrison (1915, N. Y.) 170 App. Div. 8o2, 156 N. Y. Supp. 679;
People v. Ringe (igio) 197 N. Y. 143, 9o N. E. 451.
'In re Aubrey (1904) 36 Wash. 308, 78 Pac. goo; Bessette v. People (igoi)
193 Ill. 334, 62 N. E. 215.
'State ex rel. Sampson v. City of Sheridan (1918, Wyo.) 17o Pac. i.
"Ex parte Sing Lee (1892) 96 Cal. 354, 31 Pac. 245.
'People v. Wilber (1gio) 198 N. Y. i, 9o N. E. 114o.
'State v. Ashbrook (igoo) 154 Mo. 375, 55 S. W. 627.
" See Freund, Police Power, see. 643 and cases there cited.
"Commonwealth v. Davis (1895) 162 Mass. 510, 39 N. E. 113; Davis v.
Massachusetts (1897) 167 U. S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 731; Wilson v. Eureka City
(899) 173 U. S. 32, 19 Sup. Ct 317; People ex rel. Lieberman v. Van de Carr
(I905) 199 U. S. 552, 26 Sup. Ct 144.
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the only one that seems to present reasonable success in reconciling
conflicting decisions.12
It is when we come to the consideration of due process in the revoca-
tion of licenses that serious confusion is found to prevail. An occu-
pational license, according to a preponderance of judicial opinion,
constitutes only a privilege and not a right,13 or property, 4 or a con-
tract between the State and the licensee.', It is in its nature revoca-
ble." The question therefore arises whether the license may be
revoked without notice and an opportunity for a hearing given to the
licensee. It is conceded that the power to revoke may, without violat-
ing due process, be conferred upon administrative officers, and does
not require judicial proceedings. 7  But in determining under what
circumstances notice and hearing are required, the courts appear to
have no guiding test or principle. On the whole, it may be said that
when a statute or ordinance has expressly -given power to revoke with-
out notice or hearing the courts have sustained the statute or ordinance.
But inasmuch as these enactments usually involve liquor licenses, the
decisions are sustainable on the ground that the business is a harmful
one which the State might entirely prohibit, and a license may there-
fore be granted on any conditions deemed appropriate, including its
withdrawal without notice. The "implied assent"' 8 of the licensee to
this condition is assumed by the courts. 9 On the other hand, and
clearly distinguishable, there is a group of various occupations, such
as those of physicians, lawyers and architects, requiring special study
"
2Freund, op. cit., 670.
"Dist. of Columbia v. Lee (igio, D. C.) 35 App. Cas. 341.
"Littleton v. Burgess (19o5) 2 Wyo. 173, 82 Pac. 864. But see Lowell v.
Archambault (9o5) 189 Mass. 70, 75 N. E. 65; and People v. Flynn (9o95,
N. Y.) i1o App. Div. 279, 96 N. Y. Supp. 655, aff. 184 N. Y. 579, 77 N. E. 1194.
" Union Pass. R. Co. v. Philadelphia (1879) 10, U. S. 528; Wiggins Ferry Co.
v. East St. Louis (1882) 107 U. S. 365, 2 Sup. Ct. 257.
"Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. (1876) 94 U. S. 535, 540. In private law there
is still much confusion as to the circumstances under which a license becomes
irrevocable. See Hurst v. Picture Theatres, Ltd. (C. A.) [1915] 1 K. B. i, over-
ruling Wood v. Leadbitter (1845, Exch.) 13 M. & W. 838, and note in (1915)
13 MIcH. L. REv. 4O; Phillips v. Cutler (1915) 89 Vt. 233, 95 At. 487. But
see as to irrevocability of a license to build granted under the police power,
Lowell v. Archambault, supra, note 14.
"'People v. Apfelbaum (igi) 251 Ill. 18, 95 N. W. 995; Meffert v. Packer
(19o3) 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247, aff. 195 U. S. 625, 25 Sup. Ct. 790.
"The "implied assent" is, as a matter of fact, non-existent. Justice Holmes
in the recent case of Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission of
Missouri, decided Dec. 9, 1918, 39 Sup. Ct. 24, points out that "it always is
for the interest of a party under duress to choose the lesser of two evils. But
the fact that a choice was made according to interest does not exclude duress."
9 Wallace v. Reno (1903) 27 Nev. 71, 73 Pac. 528, reviewing the decisions.
See also Commonwealth v. Kinsley (1882) 133 Mass. 578, an analogous business,
keeping a pool table for hire.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
and training, a license for which cannot be withdrawn without fair
notic- or hearing.20 Intermediate between the noxious occupations
and those requiring long and special training are a third class of
essentially useful occupations, such as those of auctioneers, hackmen,
milk dealers, dairymen, laundrymen, etc. The law or ordinance requir-
ing a license for such occupations often provides that the license is
revocable; its revocation to follow, like its grant, at the discretion of
the licensing authority, or on violation of statutes or ordinances, with-
out either providing for or excluding notice and a hearing. It is here
that particular confusion prevails both in the decisions of the courts
and in their reasons, arising largely from their propensity to cite
authority from one or other of the groups above mentioned, without
due examination of the essential differences between the three groups
and the principles which should govern them. Where, in this third
class, grant and revocation are discretionary, most courts justify a dis-
cretionary revocation on the "implied assent" of the licensee, and
apparently dismiss the consideration that the status of a person who
opens and conducts a business after license granted is different from
that of one not yet in the business ;21 other courts, a small minority,
regard the expense incurred by the licensee as a moral justification for
according him notice and a hearing before revoking his license.
22 The
New York courts justify the withdrawal without a hearing of a license
for the sale of articles likely to injure the public health, on the ground
that it is an administrative and not a judicial proceeding and therefore
requires no hearing-not a very plausible ground-and assert that the
licensee has a remedy by mandamus against arbitrary or oppressive
exercise of the power.23 A better ground would seem to be the public
emergency requiring prompt action. But where the statute authorizes
the revocation of a license as a penalty for violation of statutory pro-
visions, and no existing emergency requires immediate action, it would
seem contrary to established notions of due process to deny notice and
'Meffert v. Packer, supra (physician) ; Reetz v. Michigan (1902) i88 U. S.
505, 23 Sup. Ct 390 (physician); Ex parte Robinson (1873, U. S.) ig Wall.
505 (attorney-at-law) ; Klafter v. State Board of Architects' Examiners (1914)
259 Ill. 15, 1o2 N. E. 193 (architect).
'Child v. Bemus (i8gi) 17 P- I. 23o, 21 AUt. 539 (haclman; the court, how-
ever, expressing its preference for notice and hearing procedure) ; Wiggins v.
City of Chicago (i873) 68 Ill. 373 (auctioneer) ; Edelstein v. Bell (i9,5, N. Y.
Sup. Ct, Spec. T.) 91 Misc. 62o, 155 N. Y. Supp. 59o (motion-picture theatre);
Stone v. Pritts (i9o7) i69 Ind. 361, 82 N. E. 792 (school teacher).
'Peginis v. City of Atlanta (i909) 132 Ga. 3o2, 63 S. W. 857 (restaurant).
In New York and New Jersey, this has been held to extend even to liquor
licenses. In re Cullinan. (i9o4, N. Y.) 94 App. Div. 445, 88 N. Y. Supp. 164;
State, Lambert, Prosecutor v. Rahway (1896, Sup. Ct.) 58 N. J. L. 578, 34 At. 5.
'People ex rel. Lodes v. Dept. of Health (igo7) i89 N. Y. i87, 82 N. E. i87.
See also State ex rel. Nowotny v. City of Milwaukee (I99) 14o Wis. 38, 12i
N. E. 65&
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a hearing to a person charged with such offense.24 The recent case in
North Dakota 5 which construed a statute authorizing a Dairy Com-
missioner to revoke the license of the owner of a creamery "on convic-
tion" or "on evidence" of the misreading of a cream test as permitting
the revocation of the license on the ex parte report of an inspector,
without notice or hearing to the licensee, seems therefore contrary to
principles of due process. E. M. B.
SOME EFFECTS OF A PARTIAL ASSIGNMENT OF A CHOSE IN ACTION
It has been said that "the partial assignee of a chose in action
acquires no rights at common law."' Doubtless in making this state-
ment Dean Ames had in mind the relation of the partial assignee to
the debtor. Thus interpreted his statement is for most jurisdictions
a correct statement of the law, although, as the present writer has
elsewhere pointed out,2 there are states in America in which assignees
may enforce their claims against the debtor in "courts of law."'3  If,
however, we examine the relations between the partial assignee and
his assignor, we discover the need of limiting or at least explaining
Dean Ames's statement. It seems clear that a partial assignment
fairly implies an agreement in fact by the assignor to refrain from col-
lecting from the debtor the portion assigned. If so, obviously the
common law may attach to this agreement a contractual duty. The
cases so hold.4 As against the assignor, therefore, the partial assignee
2
"People ex rel. Loughran v. Flynn (I9O5, N. Y.) IIo App. Div. :279, 96 N. Y.
Supp. 655 and cases there cited. Even the existence of an emergency would
seem, properly, to justify only summary suspension of the license until a hearing
had been had.
'Cofman v. Osterhous (I918, N. Dak.) x68 N. W. 826. Nor is the conclusion
altered by the fact that the licensee requested and obtained a hearing from an
officer having no authority to review the ruling of the authorized officer.
'Ames, Cases on Trusts (2d ed.) 63.
' (1917) 30 HARv. L. REv. 482.
'In a code state like New York, or any state in which "common law" and
"equity" are administered by the same tribunals, the term "court of law"
can mean nothing more than the tribunal sitting with a jury in cases which,
before the consolidation of law and equity, were heard in "common law courts";
and "court of equity" can mean nothing but the same tribunal sitting without
a jury for the hearing of cases formerly cognizable in Chancery in the exercise
of its "equitable" jurisdiction. The absence of a jury in the "equity" cases
has the farther result that the appellate tribunal reviews the findings of fact
of the "equity court" in a manner different from that in which it examines a
jury's verdict So long, however, as by constitution or statute we insist that
the facts in all cases which historically were "common law" cases shall be found
by a jury, and in all "equity cases" by the judge, we shall preserve that
relativity of law which the consolidation of the two courts sought to abolish.
"Eaton v. Mellus (I856, Mass.) 7 Gray, 567; Hubbard v. Prather (i8o8,
Ky.) I Bibb. 178; 5 C. J. 968, n. 56.
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acquires at least this one right which is recognized by the common law
court. Be it noted that this right is not "exclusively legal"; it is "con-
current," i. e., concurrently legal and equitable.5 Does the partial
assignee by virtue of the assignment acquire other legal relations which
are concurrent and not exclusively equitable? This problem is involved
in the case of Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn (1918, N. Y. App. Div.) 171
N. Y. Supp. 537. In that case a written partial assignment of a money
claim against a city was made by a corporation, acting through its
president. The parties orally agreed, however, that the assignee was
not to notify the debtor of the assignment, that the assignor should
collect the whole, and that "as soon as the corporation received" the
amount of the debt from the debtor "the amount so assigned would be
paid" to the plaintiff." The president of the corporation collected the
whole sum, receiving a warrant therefor, payable, apparently, to the
order of the corporation. This warrant he deposited in the corpora-
tion's bank account and then used the funds for corporation expenses.
The corporation became bankrupt and the partial assignee then brought
an action for "conversion" against the president of the corporation.. A
recovery was denied, one of the five judges dissenting. It is proposed
to examine the soundness of this conclusion.
Apparently the result reached by the majority is based partly upon
what seems to be a misinterpretation of the agreement of the parties.
Their view seems to be that all that was promised by the defendant
was to pay the assignor as soon as the money was collected, and not
pay him out of the funds received from the debtor. Suc-r a view, it
is submitted, makes the assignment a legal nullity. Fairly interpreted,
the agreement of the parties-if we give effect to all parts of it-seems
to be that the assignor shall act as a collecting agent for the partial
assignee as undisclosed principal, paying over to the latter as soon
as collected the share of the funds to which he is in equity entitled.
Clearly, if a partial assignee himself collects his share, the money
received is his, both at "common law" and "in equity." Equally
'A "legal relation" which is recognized as valid only by the common law
and which is in conflict with a paramount equitable relation is not-.as a matter
of genuine substantive law,--a genuine legal relation, although it may have
certain procedural effects. All genuine legal relations are either (i) "con-
current" or (2) "exclusive." The former are recognized as valid by both
"law" and "equity," i. e., they are concurrently legal and equitable; the latter
are vindicated and sanctioned exclusively by equity, i. e., they are exclusively
equitable. Wesley N. Hohfeld, The Relations between Law and Equity (1913)
ii Micii. L. RFV.. 537; Walter W. Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action
(1917) 3o HARv. L. REv. 449, 455-459.
'The case does not give the exact language used. The quotation is from the
opinion of the majority. The dissenting judge says the agreement was that
when the money was paid the amount assigned "should be taken therefrom
and paid to the plaintiff."
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obvious is it that if the assignor had in the principal case disclosed the
fact of his agency to the debtor, the funds collected by him would, to
the extent of the assignment, have been held by him as a fiduci-
ary.7 Had he received money, he would have been a common law
fiduciary, as would any other agent who collects money for a principal,
and the assignee would have had a "concurrent" interest in the money
received. Doubtless as a common law fiduciary he would have been
privileged to deposit the money in a bank if unable to pay it over
immediately," and to draw out from the bank the corporation's share;
or, before deposit, to sever and use the corporation's share-always,
however, leaving a portion large enough to satisfy the assignee's claim.
If, on the other hand, he were to use the whole sum received he would
clearly be guilty of a conversion.9 Would the fact that the debtor did
not know of the agency alter these relations between the partial assignee
and the assignor? Surely not.10  Had the payment been in money,
then, it seems that the defendant would clearly have been liable for a
conversion.
The only doubtful point in the case is due to the fact that the pay-
ment was made by a warrant and not in cash. This warrant was, it
seems, payable to the order of the corporation. According to the
agreement-as we have interpreted it-the latter held this warrant in
a fiduciary capacity. While doubtless the corporation was privileged
to collect the money due on the warrant, or to deposit the warrant in
a bank, it seems that it was under a duty to retain and pay over a
proper share of the proceeds of the warrant to the partial assignee.
Was this duty exclusively equitable, or was it "concurrent," i. e., one
which a court of law as well as the chancellor would recognize and
sanction? It may be argued with force that according to the older law
the fiduciary relation would be only that of equitable trustee and cestui,
and that therefore an action for "conversion" would not lie. But it
is believed that this argument fails to take account of two facts:
(i) that in the progressive development of our legal system many
'The common law, as well as equity, had its fiduciaries: bailees, against
whom detinue lay; and guardians, "bailiffs" and "receivers," against whom
the action of account could be brought. The best discussion of these is in
Langdell, Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 75-85.
'This distinguishes the common law "bailiff" and "receiver" from the mere
bailee, who must turn over the specific thing received. All three are alike in
that they receive possession of goods or money not their own and in a fiduciary
capacity. Langdell, op. cit., 76-77.
'Wells v. Collins (1889) 74 Wis. 341, 43 N. W. 16o; Mechem, Agency (2d
ed.) sec. 1256.
" That is, as between the parties. It has even been held that where an agent
for an undisclosed principal buys chattels with the latter's money, the chattels
"belong to the principal" even as against innocent third persons who subse-
quently purchase the goods from the agent for value and in the belief that
the agent owns them. Keinpner v. Dillard (1907) ioo Tex. 5o5, ioi S. W. 437.
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duties and other legal relations which formerly were exclusively
equitable have become "concurrent"; (2) that in New York, where
the principal case was decided, all courts are courts of both "common
law" and "equity" and that this has hastened the transformation of
exclusively equitable jural relations into "concurrent" relations vindi-
cated and sanctioned by both courts."' For that reason many of the
older notions are no longer law.'2 For example, as bearing directly
upon the immediate question, consider the decisions in New York that
"trover" for "conversion" will lie against a factor who has sold goods
on commission and does not, after deducting his cormmission, pay the
proceeds over to his principal-all without any discussion of whether
the factor received payment in money or in a check or bank draft pay-
able to his own order. 3 In the latter case, according to older notions,
while the factor might be liable as a "bailiff" in the common law
action of account,' 4 his principal could not recover for conversion of
the check or bank draft, for the "legal title" to that was clearly in
the factor. If the principle involved in these cases relating to factors
is to be followed, there is no reason why a code action at law for
damages should not be allowed against the corporation, even though
the complaint describes the wrong as "conversion." If an action of
this kind would lie against the corporation, it would on well-recognized
principles lie against the defendant, who as president did the actual
"converting." It is believed, therefore, that the conclusion reached by
the dissenting judge is preferable to that of the majority of the court.
W. W. C.
This does not mean that a "concurrent" right, for example, gives the holder
his option of suing on it either at law or in equity. The refusal of equity to
enjoin the enforcement of a right in the common law court is a recognition
of its validity so as to make it "concurrent" within the meaning intended to
be conveyed by that term.
'Under the influence of code procedure facts which were formerly a ground
for relief in equity way of injunction and a decree for a conveyance of the
outstanding "bare legal title" are to-day frequently held to constitute "legal
defenses," i. e., they may be set up by way of answer merely instead of by
counterclaim. Illustrations are: Lindell v. Lindell (917) 135 Minn. 368, 16o
N. W. IO3I, commented upon in (97) 26 YALE LANW JoURtNAL, 592; Chicago
& N. W. R. Co. v. McKeigue (i9o6) 126 Wis. 574, ,05 N. W. 1030. Indeed, is
not every case in which a "common law" count for "money had and received"
is allowed against a "constructive trustee" an illustration of the transformation
of an exclusively equitable jural relation into one which is "concurrent"?
"Britton v. Ferrin (19o2) 171 N. Y. 235, 63 N. E. 954. Under the New York
law a factor is a fiduciary, in the absence of agreement to the contrary. This
view is apparently not that of all jurisdictions. While a fiduciary when the
proceeds of his principal's goods are first received, he is usually regarded as
authorized by business usage to appropriate the proceeds and become a mere
debtor. Mechem, Agency (2d ed.) sec. 2543.
" Godfrey v. Saunders 1(776, C. B.) 3 Wils. 73.
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EFFECT ON CONTRACTS OF WAR ORDERS OR OTHER ACTS OF STATE
It has generally been stated to be the rule that impossibility arising
subsequently to the formation of the contract does not excuse a con-
tractor from the usual consequences of non-performance; he must
pay damages to the other party.' To this rule, however, there are
several classes of exceptions: first, where the impossibility is caused
by a change in the domestic law; secondly, where the subject-matter
of the contract is destroyed; and thirdly, where the impossibility is
caused by death or illness of the party bound to perform. As has
been asserted in this JOURNAL, 2 these exceptions practically nullify the
general rule. It is believed that no case can be found where a
promisor has been held to pay damages for failing to perform an act
that has become absolutely impossible without any fault of his own.
The rule it is believed should be stated to be that a contractor is not
excused from performing merely on the ground of increased difficulty
or expense.
The question of impossibility as an excuse for non-performance
has come up in a somewhat new aspect in a number of cases during
the great war. Thus in Moore & Tierney v. Roxford Knitting Co.
(1918, N. D. N. Y.) 250 Fed. 278, where a buyer claimed damages
for failure to make and deliver goods as per contract, the seller
replied that it was prevented from performing because of orders for
goods given by the United States government for war purposes, these
orders having precedence by Act of Congress.' By reason of the non-
delivery, the buyer had himself declared the contract at an end. As
in many other cases during the war the negotiations between the
manufacturer and the government agents were very informal. The
agent had asked what was the mill's capacity for making knitted
goods for the government, and further said, "I would request you
not to write me that you are sold up and cannot furnish any of these
goods. I am aware that this condition prevails with every one."
Later an order was given requiring the mill's full oapacity and advis-
ing that the order was obligatory, although no reference was made
to the Acts of Cotigress. These Acts provided that orders of the
government "shall be obligatory" and "shall take precedence over
all other orders and contracts." Refusal to comply was made a crime;
and on refusal to fill orders at reasonable prices the President was
authorized to take possession of the factory.
The court held that the informal order was obligatory and that the
seller acted under compulsion; also that the contractual duty to the
'Paradine v. Jane (1647) Aleyn, 26.
'Discharge of Contract (1913) 22 YA= LAW JOURNAL, 513, 519.
"Nat'l Defence Act, June 3, 1916, 39 St at L. 166, and Naval Appropriations
Act, March 4, 1917, 39 St. at L. 1168.
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buyer was at an end and that the buyer had no right to damages for
breach. It would have been otherwise had the seller voluntarily sought
the government work and thus intentionally disabled itself from
performing the contract with the buyer.4
It is to be observed that in the Roxford Knitting Company case the
duty to deliver as agreed was expressly subject to delays or non-
delivery by reason of strikes, accidents, or for any reason beyond the
control of the seller. The decision might well be regarded as resting
upon this provision, although little was said of it. Even in the
absence of such a provision, however, the decision would probably
be the same. Thus in a late English case,5 where a claim for damages
was made for failure to deliver raspberries as agreed, and where the
contract apparently contained no similar provision, it was held to be
a good defense that the government had requisitioned the defendant's
whole supply.8
In the case of the knitting company, stated above, the government
order did not make performance totally impossible; for not only
could the goods have been manufactured after the government work
was done, but it was not totally impossible to increase the size and
capacity of the plant-admitting that this night have been extremely
difficult and expensive. The seller did not claim to be totally dis-
charged but claimed only that delay was justified. This would be
correct, and the buyer would still be bound to pay for the goods, unless
the delay should prove to be so great as to prevent what is often called
"This principle is specifically applied in the still more recent case of Mawhin-
ney v. Millbrook Woolen Mills (x918, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 172 N. Y. Supp. 461. If
the government contract is voluntarily sought because of war profits, or if the
government in a~varding the contract did not demand precedence in accordance
with the Act of Congress, the contractor is not excused for failure to perform
his private contract
For another and more doubtful variation in the application of the rule, see
Standard Silk D. Co. v. Roessler (1917) 244 Fed. 25o, (i918) 27 YALE LAW
JoTRbNAL, 408.
'Lipton v. Ford [1917] 2 K. B. 647.
'The English statute differs somewhat from the Acts of Congress. "It is
hereby declared that where the fulfilment by any person of any contract is
interfered with by the necessity on the part of himself or any other person of
complying with (government requirements) . . . . that necessity is a good
defense to any action or proceeding taken against that person in respect of
the non-fulfilment of the contract so far as it is due to that interference."
Defence of the Realm, No. 2, Act (5 Geo. 5, c. 37) sec. i, sub-sec. 2. Under
such a statute as this a contractor would be excused by much less than a totalimpossibility, and it would be unnecessary to determine whether the contract
called for specific raspberries or berries to be grown- on specific land, as in
Howell v. Coupland (1876) L. R. i Q. B. D. 258.
Where the contract contains a provision like that in the principal case it is
clearly discharged by a government requisition of the entire plant Metropolitan
Water Board v. Dick (1917, H. L.) 117 L. T. Rep. 766. See (i918) 27 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 953.
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"substantial performance." The buyer's duty to pay would surely be
constructively conditional upon performance within some period of
time that would be reasonable.
A contract containing a provision like that in the knitting case
really creates no duty to deliver goods at all events but only a duty
to deliver in case reasonable diligence would cause performance to
take place.7  Even in the absence of such a provision, there is a ten-
dency to excuse a contractor by something less than absolute impos-
sibility." But mere "economic unprofitableness," even though that
is due to war conditions, is not an excuse for failure to perform.9
In one of the cases cited above0 the court denied that mere impos-
sibility caused by an act of the legislature or of the executive would
excuse a contractor, saying that the "true rule is that where per-
formance of a contract, legal when made, becomes illegal, by some
event, statute, decision, or lawful act of public authorities, both parties
are excused from further performance." Of course this rule is cor-
rect in its affirmative form. Where impossibility of performance arises
from a change in the law of our own country, making performance
of a previously made contract unlawful, the obligation is dissolved
and there is no liability for non-performance.1 ' That the court's
'So in Davison Chemical Co. v. Baugh Chemical Co. (1918, Md. App.) 1O4
At. 4o4, a manufacturer of acid was excused from delivery because war in
Europe made the procurement of pyrites impossible. A better acid could have
been made from brimstone, which was obtainable; but the expense would have
been twice as great. A similar decision was rendered by the House of Lords
in Wilson & Co. v. Tennants [1917] A. C. 495.
"See North German Lloyd v. Guaranty Trust Co. (1917, U. S.) 37 Sup. Ct
49o; Clarksville Land Co. v. Harriman (1895) 68 N. H. 374, 44 Atl. 527;
Baily v. De Crespigny (1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. i8o. Cf. Watts & Co. v. Mitsui(H. L.) [1917] A. C. 227. In Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard (1916) 172 Cal.
289, 156 Pac. 458, the court said that "prohibitive cost" was the same as impos-
sibility "to all fair intents." A similar statement was made by Maule, J., in
Dahl v. Nelson (18i) 6 App. Cas. 38, 52.
'Wilson & Co. v. Tennants [1917] 1 K. B. 208, [1917] A. C. 495; Dixon v.
Henderson (1917, K. B.) 112 L. T. Rep. 636. In a general way this is admitted
by the court in Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, supra.
1
oMawhinney v. Millbrook Woolen Mills, supra.
I Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Mottley (1911) 219 U. S. 467, 31 Sup. Ct. 265;
Cowley v. N. P. R. R. Co. (1912) 68 Wash. 558, 123 Pac. 998; Cordes v.
Miller (1878) 39 Mich. 581; Jamieson v. Indiana Nat. Gas Co. (1891) 128 Ind.
555, 28 N. E. 76; Baltimore etc. R. R. Co. v. O'Donnell (1892) 49 Ohio St
489, 32 N. E. 476; Hanford v. Connecticut Fair Assn. (1918) 92 Conn. 621,
1O3 Atl. 838, (1918) 28 YALE LAW jou AL, 198. If the contract was made
subsequently to the passage of the law, it was illegal and void ab initio.
It appears also that a promisor's liability may be terminated where his per-
formance is prevented by some act of the state, even though the act is brought
about by the fault or inefficiency of the promisor himself. Hughes v. Wamsutta
Mills (1865, Mass.) Ii Allen, 2oi (prevention by imprisonment for crime);
State v. Herber (1918, Okla.) 173 Pac. 651 (bondsmen discharged when their
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rule is correct in its negative part may well be doubted. The state-
ment of Lord Reading' 2 is to be preferred: "It is true that the act
to be performed was not rendered unlawful by an act of the legis-
lature passed since the entering into of the contract, but it was a law-
ful act of state which equally rendered the delivery of these specific
goods impossible."'
3
It is altogether probable that a contract the performance of which
would require a breach of the law of some friendly nation would now
be held to be illegal and void. If this is true, and possibly even if it
is not, a change in some foreign law making the performance of a
previously made contract illegal (or impossible) ought to be given the
same effect as would a like change in the domestic law.14
A. L. C.
failure to produce prisoner in court was caused by his imprisonment for another
crime); Moshenz v. Independent Order etc. (1913) 215 Mass. 185, 102 N. E.
324 (injunction due to illegal acts); People v. Globe Mut. L. I. Co. (1883)
91 N. Y. 174 (dissolution of corporation for failure to maintain a reserve).
But impossibility due to bankruptcy does not terminate liability. Central. Trust
Co. v. Chicago Auditorium (1915) 24o U. S. 581, 36 Sup. Ct. 412.
'In re Shipton and Harrison's Arbitration [1915] 3 K. B. 676.
"A case might be put where performance is rendered impossible by an unlaw-
ful act of the commander in chief.
" See Ford v. Cotesworth (187o) L. R_ 5 Q. B. 544; Cunningham v. Dunn
(1878) 3 C. P. D. 443. This aspect of the matter is treated at length by Lorenzen,
Moratory Legislation Relating to Bills and Notes and the Conflict of Laws,
supra, p. 324.
